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Harris: Evidence - Expert Testimony - Admissibility of Expert Testimony:

CASE NOTES
EVIDENCE-EXPERT TESTIMONY-Admissibility of Expert Testimony:
Wyoming Takes A Moderate Approach.
On the night of November 16, 1982, sixteen-year-old Richard Jahnke
shot and killed his father at their home in Cheyenne, Wyoming. Jahnke was
arrested and charged, as an adult, with first degree murder and conspiracy
to commit first degree murder.'
The evidence at trial indicated that since he was two years old Jahnke
had suffered physical and mental abuse from his father.2 As part of a novel
self-defense argument, 8 Jahnke attempted to introduce the testimony of
Dr. John M. MacDonald, a physician and forensic psychiatrist, to explain
the psychological effects of being a battered child and indicate how these
might support a self-defense plea.' The trial court ruled that Dr.
MacDonald's testimony was inadmissible because the psychology of abused
children was not a proper subject for expert testimony. 5
The jury found Jahnke guilty of the lesser included offense of voluntary
manslaughter, and the court sentenced him to five to fifteen years in the
state penitentiary.6 Jahnke appealed both the verdict and the 7sentence,
citing as one error the exclusion of Dr. MacDonald's testimony.
The case raised important questions about the admissibility of expert
testimony under Wyoming law. In a long line of cases, the Wyoming
Supreme Court has deferred to lower court decisions on the admissibility of
evidence. 8 More specifically, the court has said that "admission or rejection
of expert testimony on a wide range of subjects is a decision within the
sound discretion of the trial court; and that court's decision will only be
reversed upon a showing of clear and prejudicial abuse." 9 The Supreme
Court has indicated, however, that trial courts must follow certain
guidelines to determine the admissibility of expert testimony. If an attorney can demonstrate to the trial court that an expert's testimony fits
within these guidelines, the evidence should be admitted.
This Note explores the admissibility of expert testimony in Wyoming
trial courts. First, the guidelines for admissibility are defined. Then expert
testimony on the psychology of battered children provides an example of
the kind of novel scientific evidence which is admissible under current
Wyoming law.
1. Record on Appeal, Jahnke v. State, No. 83-70, Vol. I at 9 (Wyo. argued Sept. 7, 1983).
2. Id., Vol. IV at 765-67; Brief for Appellee, Jahnke v. State, No. 83-70, at 8 (Wyo. argued
Sept. 7, 1983).
3. The argument is novel because, as research by this author and others indicates, no other
defendant in a patricide case has offered evidence on the psychology of battered children
to support a self-defense plea. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 2, at 37.
4. Record on Appeal, supra note 1, Vol. IV at 533-35.
5. Id. at 529-30, 546-47.
6. Id., Vol. I at 188, 228-29.
7. Brief for Appellant, Jahnke v. State, No. 83-70, at 15-27 (Wyo. argued Sept. 7, 1983).
8. Taylor v. State, 642 P.2d 1294, 1295 (Wyo. 1982).
9. Smith v. State, 564 P.2d 1194, 1199 (Wyo. 1977).
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THE TEST FOR ADMISSIBILITY
OF EXPERT TESTIMONY

Juries frequently face issues they cannot understand on the basis of
common knowledge and experience. In such a case, an expert with
specialized knowledge or experience can help the jury. The expert's ability
to assist the jury justifies exceptions to the general rules of evidence, and
0
the expert is allowed to testify to facts not personally perceived,' or to
the
from
draw
should
jury
the
which
the
conclusions
about
give an opinion
facts.'
Because these exceptions are appropriate only when the expert is able
to help the jury, expert testimony is bound by two restrictions. First, where
the subject is within the common understanding of the jury, expert
testimony is simply unnecessary. Second, where the expert's field of
science is so novel or experimental as to be unreliable, the expert can offer
little aid to the jury. Expert testimony should not be admitted if it falls outside these bonds, but courts have not always found it easy to determine
when expert testimony satisfies the requirements and should be admitted.
Courts have developed special tests to deal with the problems of admissibility of expert testimony, and two of these tests are widely used. The
Frye test comes from the 1923 case of Frye v. United States.1 2 The Rules
test is found in the Uniform Rules of Evidence.18 The Wyoming Supreme
Court, in Buhrte v. State, 14 has set forth a test which combines elements
from both of these. A brief examination of both the Frye and Rules tests
will help define the hybrid test Wyoming has adopted.
A. The Frye Test
In the Frye case, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals addressed,
for the first time, the question of admissibility of expert testimony on the
results of a lie detector test. The court said:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to
define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in
admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is
made must be sufficiently established to have gained acceptance in
the particular field in which it belongs.'5
10. W.R.E. 602 provides that a witness may not testify to a matter unless the witness has
personal knowledge of the matter, but expert witnesses are explicitly excepted from the
rule.
11. W.R.E. 701 limits opinion testimony by lay witnesses but does not limit expert witnesses.
W.R.E. 702 specifically states that expert witnesses may testify in the form of opinions,
and W.R.E. 704 expressly indicates that expert witnesses may give opinions even if they
embrace ultimate issues for the trier of fact to decide.
12. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).

13.

NEW UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE,

Rule 702 (1974).

14. 627 P.2d 1374 (Wyo. 1981).
15. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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This portion of the opinion is frequently quoted and often used by other
courts considering the admissibility of expert testimony based on a novel

science. 16

The general acceptance standard of the Frye test ensures that the
scientific basis of an expert's testimony is sufficiently reliable and
trustworthy. 17 This has been identified as a valid evidentiary concern by
both courts 8 and legal scholars.' 9
The Frye test, however, has long been the object of "scathing
attacks"20 because it is confusing and overly conservative. Strict application of the Frye test unnecessarily delays the use of reliable and helpful
evidence simply because the science is novel. 2' Louisell and Mueller wrote
that the Frye test "should be abandoned" because it does not lead to
22
predictable results and because it often excludes useful information. McCormick said that the general acceptance standard "is a proper condition
for taking judicial notice of scientific
facts, but not a criterion for the ad'2
missibility of scientific evidence. 3
B. The Rules Test
Rule 702 of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence, identical to both the
Uniform Rule and the Federal Rule, provides this test for admissibility of
expert testimony:
Rule 702. If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form
24
of an opinion or otherwise.
Under this Rule, the witness must qualify as an expert. More importantly, the expert's testimony must assist the trier of fact. The advisory
committee's notes indicate that the key consideration under Rule 702 is
"whether the untrained layman would be qualified to determine intelligently and to the best possible degree the particular issue without enlightenment from those having a specialized understanding of the subject involved
in the dispute." 25 Thus, where a subject is "wholly within the ambit of
16. The general acceptance test is "probably the most widely quoted portion of any decision
involving novel scientific test results." A. MOENSSENS, LEGAL ADMISSIBILITY OF THE
POLYGRAPH, at 14 (Ansley ed. 1975).
17. Strong, QuestionsAffecting the Admissibility ofScientific Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L. F. 1,
12-13 (1970).
18. United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973).
19. 1 LOUISELL AND MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE, § 105 at 822 (1980).
20. P. Giannelli, The Frye Test: A Half-CenturyLater, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1206 (1980).
The test has been called "archaic," "a sport," "antiquated on the day of its pronouncement," and "infamous." Id., n.59.
21. This tendency to delay the use of evidence was convincingly criticized by one judge:
"Society need not tolerate homicide until there develops a body of medical literature
about some particular lethal agent." Coppolino v. State, 223 S.2d 68, 75 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1968) (Mann, J., concurring specially).
22. 1 LOUISELL AND MUELLER, supranote 19, § 105 at 826, 828.
23. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE, § 203 at 491 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972).
24. W.R.E. 702.
25. FED. R. EID. 702, Advisory Committee's Notes.
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ordinary experience," ' 26 an expert would not help the jury and the
testimony should not be admitted.
On the other hand, the advisory notes cite Wigmore for the principle
that expert opinions should be excluded only when they are "unhelpful and
therefore superfluous and a waste of time."12 7 Under the Rules, "the door
to expert testimony has been opened far wider than before." '28 Perhaps the
door has been opened too wide, and if the Rules test is not rigorously applied it could admit undependable2 9scientific evidence which misleads lay
jurors by its apparent infallibility.
C. The Wyoming Test
In Buhrle, the Wyoming Supreme Court upheld a trial court's exclusion
of expert testimony. Edith Buhrle had been convicted of second degree
murder for the killing of her husband. Asserting the theory of self-defense,
Buhrle offered expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome, but the
trial court rejected the evidence. In its opinion, the Supreme Court
established the following test to be used in determining the admissibility of
expert testimony in Wyoming courts:
(1)... the subject matter 'must be so distinctively related to some
science, profession, business, or occupation as to be beyond the ken
of the average layman;' (2) 'the witness must have skill, knowledge,
or experience in that field or calling as to make it appear that his
opinion or inference will probably aid the trier of fact in his search
for the truth;' (3) expert testimony is inadmissible if 'the state of
the pertinent art or scientific knowledge does not permit a
reasonable opinion to be asserted even by an expert.'8 0
Parts (1) and (2) of this test restate the Rule 702 requirements that the
expert be qualified and that the testimony assist the trier of fact because
the subject is beyond common knowledge or experience. Part (3) adds an
additional requirement.
The state, arguing as appellee in the Jahnke case, apparently believed
that the Wyoming Supreme Court had adopted the Frye test as the third
criterion of this three part test.31 Even the trial court judge, in noting that
never been accepted by another court, may have been referthe science had
2
ring to Frye.
3 LOUISELL AND MUELLER, supra note 19, § 382, at 643.
FED. R. EviD. 702, Advisory Committee's Notes (citing 7 Wigmore § 1918).
3 LOUISELL AND MUELLER, supra note 19, § 380 at 633.
Cf. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal.3d 75, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244-45, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 14648
(1976).
30. Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1376 (Wyo. 1981)
31. The state's brief read: "The third criteria [sic] in the test, requiring as a condition of admissibility that evidence of a scientific nature be generally accepted by the pertinent
scientific community, is a well-accepted requirement in criminal cases. Its origins are
generally traced to the decision in Frye v. United States. "Brief for Appellee, supranote
2, at 32.
32. The trial court judge did not use the Frye test exactly, however, for he required acceptance in other courts instead of acceptance in the scientific field. Record on Appeal, supra
note 1, Vol. IV at 546-47.
26.
27.
28.
29.
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The Buhrle opinion should not, however, be read to adopt the Fryetest.
The court did not explicitly adopt or even cite the Frye test, and the
language of the third criterion is quite different from the general acceptance language of Frye. In addition, there are several reasons that the
Buhrle opinion should not be read to adopt the Frye test by implication.
First, given the history and background of the three part test set out in
Buhrle, it would be inappropriate to use the Frye test in place of the third
criterion. The Wyoming court took the three part test, word for word, from
Dyas v. UnitedStates. sDyas, like Frye, was decided by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Pointedly silent about its fifty-four year old Frye
precedent, the Dyas court adopted a new test of admissibilty directly from
McCormick's text on evidence, 4 and McCormick was very critical of the
Frye test.8 5 In support of his three part test, McCormick cited Wigmore's
statement that the only true criterion for determining the admissibility of
expert testimony should be: "On this subject can a jury receive from this
person appreciable help?"38 Wigmore also preferred a test less restrictive
than Frye.
Second, the Frye test is inconsistent with Rule 702.37 The Wyoming
Supreme Court decided Buhrle nearly three and a half years after adopting
the Rules of Evidence, 8 and it seems unlikely that the court would embrace
such an inconsistency. In 1983, the court commented on a "shift in
philosophy with respect to expert testimony under the Rules of
Evidence," '8 9 and said that under the Rules, expert testimony 40should be excluded "only when it will not be helpful to the trier of fact.1
Third, it is significant that the Buhrle opinion never cited Frye. The
court was surely aware of the Frye test. Justice Brown, who wrote the
Buhrle opinion, cited Frye only eight months later in a dissent to Chapman
v. State."1 Even in that dissent, Brown only observed that a few states had
applied the Frye test in factually similar cases. He indicated no approval of
the Frye test, and neither did the majority, which did not even cite Frye in
the Chapman opinion.
Finally, the holding in Buhrle indicates that the Frye test was not
adopted. The Buhrle court held that the expert evidence on the battered
woman syndrome had been properly excluded because the facts did not indicate the presence of the battered woman syndrome, and because the
defendant had failed to carry the burden of demonstrating that the state of
the art would permit a reasonable expert opinion.' 2 The Supreme Court did
not reject the underlying science of a battered woman syndrome, or even
33. 376 A.2d 827, 832 (D.C. 1977).
34. MCCORMICK, supra note 23, § 13 at 29-31.
35. Id. at § 203.
36. 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 1923 at 29 (Chadbourn rev. 1978) (emphasis in original).
37. "TheFrye standard... seems at odds with Rule 702." 3 LOUISELL AND MUELLER, supra
note 19, § 382 at 644.
38. Buhrle was decided May 13, 1981. Wyoming adopted the Rules of Evidence effective
January 1, 1978. ORDER OF THE WYOMING SUPREME COURT, August 26, 1977.
39. Reed v. Hunter, 663 P.2d 513, 518 (Wyo. 1983).
40. Id.
41. 638 P.2d 1280, 1290 (Wyo. 1982) (Brown, J., dissenting).
42. 627 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Wyo. 1981).
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consider whether the science met the Frye standard of general acceptance.
In fact, the court stated that it did not "deny the science of a battered
woman syndrome and all its ramifications.' 48 This was a decision on the
burden of proof, not an adoption of the Frye test.
While the third criterion of the test set out in Buhrle is not the Frye
test, it does add something beyond the requirements of the Rules test. The
court added this third requirement because of "the 'aura of special reliabili44
ty and trustworthiness' surrounding scientific or expert testimony." The
court wanted to protect the jury from being misled by testimony which appeared more reliable than it was, but feared the Rules test alone would not
exclude this deceptive evidence. The Wyoming test therefore explicitly requires that the scientific basis of an expert's testimony be reliable. Unfortunately, the Buhrle opinion gives no further explanation of what the court
meant by reliable.
45
A fourth Circuit case, United States v. Baller, provides a good approach to the reliability problem:

In order to prevent deception or mistake and to allow the possibility of effective response, there must be a demonstrable, objective
procedure for reaching the opinion and qualified persons who can
either duplicate the result or criticize the means by which it was
reached, drawing their own conclusions from the underlying
facts. 46
The Wyoming court probably intended that a similar approach should be
used in applying its test. Where an effective procedure underlies the expert's opinions, and there are other experts who can confirm or refute the
conclusions, the expert's testimony is sufficently reliable to satisfy the requirements of the Wyoming test.
By adopting a test somewhere between the restrictive Frye test and
the liberal Rules test, the Wyoming Supreme Court has taken a cautious
but innovative approach to the problem of admissibility of expert
testimony. By requiring a qualified expert, a subject beyond common
understanding, and a reliable scientific basis for the expert's testimony, the
Wyoming test seems designed to give the greatest possible assistance to
juries facing complex or technical issues.

II. ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BATrERED CHILDREN
Wyoming trial courts enjoy a broad discretion in admitting or rejecting
evidence,'4 7 but the test for admissibility of expert testimony should guide
the decision. The attorney trying to introduce evidence on the psychology
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973)).
519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1976).
Id. at 466.
See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
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of battered children as part of a self-defense argument must convince the
trial court that the expert testimony passes the test.
A. Qualified Expert
Under the Wyoming Rules of Evidence, 8 the standards which the expert must meet are broad and flexible. 49 Finding a witness who qualifies as
an expert might seem to be an easy task.50 Of course, some experts are
simply better witnesses than others. Regardless of qualifications, the expert who explains complex ideas clearly and who appears pleasant and
trustworthy will carry more weight with the jury.5 1
The attorney offering evidence on the psychology of abused children
should, however, select the expert more carefully than the Rules alone require. Because the court will be unfamiliar with the science, the witness
chosen should be beyond reproach. The expert should have the best possible
credentials in clinical or forensic psychiatry.52 The expert should have experience with or particular knowledge of battered children and their special
problems, 53 and the expert's methods should be relatively orthodox. The
court may rely on the expert when deciding if the testimony meets the
other requirements of admissibility, 54 and the better qualified the expert
the more comfortable the trial court will feel in admitting the testimony.
The expert must also be able to help the attorney understand the basics
of the scientific field. The attorney must be familiar with the subject to convince the trial court that the testimony meets the requirements of
admissibility.
B. Subject Beyond Common Understanding
Once the defendant has testified that the victim was an abusive
parent, 5 an expert witness can explain the psychological characteristics of
abused children which support the elements of self-defense. In Wyoming,
the elements are, first, that the defendant had a reasonable belief that he
was in danger of death or serious bodily injury, and second, that the killing
was perceived as the necessary and reasonable way to avoid the danger .56
While any juror could sense that parental abuse would have some effect on
the child, only an expert could identify specific psychological traits and
relate them to the self-defense argument.
48. W.R.E. 702.
49. 3 LOUISELL AND MUELLER, supra note 19, § 380 at 634.
50. For references contact: Kempe National Center for Child Abuse, 1205 Oneida, Denver,
Colorado 80220; John F. Kennedy Child Development Center, University of Colorado
Medical Center, Denver, Colorado 80220; American Humane Association Children's Division, Box 1266, Denver, Colorado 80201
51. The expert might want to read an article like E. BENEDEK, The Expert Witness, in CHILD
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw, 46-55 (D. Schetky and E. Benedek, eds. 1980).
52. Some courts have questioned the competency of a psychologist, as opposed to a
psychiatrist (who is medically trained and licensed) to give testimony on mental disorders.
Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1962),
53. Although a specialist in a particular branch of the science is not generally required, a
physician whose primary practice was internal medicine and who only had "occasion to
treat battered women" was not considered qualified to testify on the battered women
syndrome in People v. White, 90 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 414 N.E.2d 196, 200 (1980).
54. See, e.g., Hodo v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 778, 106 Cal. Rptr., 547 (1973) in which
the expert was called on to testify about the validity of the scientific technique.
55. This testimony should be admissible under W.R.E. 404(a).
56. Garcia v. State, 667 P.2d 1148, 1152 (Wyo. 1983).
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The literature on the psychology of battered children reveals specific
characteristics which demonstrate how an abused child could reasonably
believe he was in great danger and could save himself only through deadly
force. A qualified expert could testify to these and other psychological
traits which help support the self-defense argument.
1. Reasonable Belief in Danger
A defendant's subjective belief that he was in great danger is not
enough to support a self-defense plea. The belief must be one that a
reasonable person would have had in the defendant's situation.5 7 In the
case of an abused child killing a parent, an expert can help the jury understand the situation of a battered child.
The expert can explain that a battered child perceives things differently from the ordinary child. For example, an abused child is often "hypervigilant" 58 or "hypermonitoring" 5 9 of adults. Forced to adapt to a
dangerous world, an abused child is quick to sense danger in the parent's
facial expressions, tones of voice, or mannerisms. 0 Having been abused
before, the child is well aware of the danger of severe abuse, and is extremely afraid of such violence.61
By explaining these unusual characteristics, the expert can help the
jury understand that the reasonable person in the situation of a battered
child would be quick to perceive a threat from the abusive parent. Under
the circumstances, even a quickly formed belief could be entirely
reasonable, but the jury would be unaware of this without the assistance of
the expert.
2. Necessary and Reasonable Means of Avoiding the Danger
Many people wonder why a child capable of killing a parent could not
more easily have left home to escape the abuse. The expert can explain why
the battered child may be incapable of leaving.
A common characteristic of battered children is extreme lack of selfrespect or self-esteem. 62 When the child is constantly told he is bad, and
punished for not meeting the expectations of the abusive parent, that child
comes to believe that he deserves such treatment.6 8 Because he believes he
is at fault, the abused child is so ashamed that he covers up for the abusive
57. Schiekofsky v. State, 636 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Wyo. 1981).
58. H. Martin & P. Beezley, BehavioralObservations ofAbused Children, DEVELOPMENTAL
MEDICINE AND CHILD NEUROLOGY, Vol. 19, No. 3, at 375 (June 1977).
59. C. JONES, ChildrenAfter Abuse, in PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO CHILD ABUSE, 159
(N. Frude, ed. 1981).
60. H. MARTIN & M. RODEHEFFER, The Psychological Impact of Abuse on Children, in
TRAUMATIC ABUSE AND NEGLECT OF CHILDREN AT HOME, 257 (G. Williams and J.
Money, eds. 1980).
61. T. GAENSBAUER, D. MRAZEK, & R. HARMON, Emotional Expression in Abused and/or
Neglected Infants, in FRuDE, supra note 59, at 121.
62. JONES, supra note 59, at 157; T. REIDY et at., Abused and Neglected Children: The
Cognitive, Socia, and BehavioralCorelates,in WILLIAMS AND MONEY, sUpranote 60,
at 288-89.
63. A. Green, PsychopathologyofAbused Children,JOURNAL OF CHILD PSYCHIATRY, Vol. 17,
No. 1 at 96-99 (Winter 1978).
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parent.64 He is unlikely to mention the problem to anyone, much less to
draw attention to himself by seeking help or running away from home.
The battered child is also convinced that if he escapes he will only face
severe punishment when he is caught. The child believes that the parent
will find him, or that the authorities will return him to his home, and he will
suffer more abuse from the angry parent. 66 Believing there is no place to go
and no one to help, the child feels entirely helpless.66 One twenty-nine year
old woman who had been abused as a child told her psychiatrist why she
could not have left her violent home:
I remember I made a decision not to go to the police. I had the
proof, marks on my face, and so on, and despite the urging of a
friend's father, I could not bring myself to do it, mostly because I
felt I wouldn't win (because I knew I wouldn't be believed; ... the
victim becomes the accused) and because I could envision what it
would do to my father's career as a teacher. The price seemed to be
too high to pay. I would only be returned to the abusive environment anyway. 67
In studies of abused wives, Dr. Lenore Walker found that battered
women exhibit characteristics similar to those of battered children. Like
abused children, the women suffered from extremely low self-esteem and
believed they deserved the treatment. Like abused children, they believed
that the abuser would get them and punish them if they left. Like abused
children, the women believed they had no place to go and no one to help
them. Dr. Walker found that these characteristics created a "learned
helplessness" which rendered abused wives incapable of leaving their
abusive husbands."8 An expert witness could testify that abused children
suffer the same inability. A reasonable person in the situation of a battered
child could easily believe that the only way to avoid the perceived threat
was by self-defense.
Another common characteristic of abused children is an overly aggressive or violent disposition. 69 The adult role model this child patterns
himself after is that of a violent parent.7 0 When violence is an ordinary part
of life, it seems entirely reasonable to use deadly force in self-defense.
By themselves, these characteristics do not prove self-defense. The
jury will have to consider the facts of the case. The expert can, however, explain these characteristics in order to help the jury assess the facts. The
64. D. BROADHURST, The Effect of ChildAbuse and Neglect on the School-Aged Child, in THE
MALTREATMENT OF THE SCHOOL-AGED CHILD, at 19 (R. Volpe, M. Breton, and J. Mitton,
eds. 1908).
65. J. ZEMDEGS, Outraged: What It Feels Like to be an Abused Child, in VOLPE, supranote
64, at 103.
66. Id. at 91.
67. Id. at 104.
68. L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN, at 43. (Harper Colophon ed. 1980).
69. M. MAIN, Abusive and Rejecting Infants, in FRUDE, supra note 59, at 29-30; T. REIDY,
The Agressive Characteristics of Abused and Neglected Children, in WILLIAMS and
MoNEiY, supranote 60, at 262, 266-67.
70. H. MARTIN, The Child andHis Development, in HELPING THE BATTERED CHILD AND HIS
FAMILY, at 104-05 (C. Kempe and R. Heifer, eds. 1972).
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expert can identify the characteristics and explain them with depth and
clarity beyond the average juror's knowledge. Being untrained in
psychology, the average juror is simply unaware of the severity and complexity of a battered child's psychological wounds. On this subject, the expert's testimony would assist the jury, and the second requirement of the
test for admissibility is satisfied.
C. Reliability
Courts applying the Frye test have used three types of evidence to
establish general acceptance of a science: scientific literature, judicial opinions, and expert testimony. 71 The Wyoming requirement of reliability is not
the same as the Frye test,7 2 but the attorney offering expert testimony on
the psychology of battered children can use the same types of evidence to
demonstrate the reliability of the science.
The primary literature on the psychology of battered children is full of
careful explanations of the research methods employed. 73 The secondary
literature often contains critiques and comparisons of the methods, results,
and conclusions of others in the field. 74 The methods are objective and
demonstrable, and there are many others qualified to confirm or refute an
expert's opinion. Under the Baller definition,7 . the science of the
psychology of battered children is reliable.
To gain support from judicial opinions, the attorney must avoid terms
like "the battered child syndrome" 76 and emphasize that the subject is the
psychology of battered children. The expert is a practitioner of clinical or
forensic psychiatry, and courts usually admit psychiatric evidence without
hesitation.7 7 The expert witness is merely applying this reliable science to a
particular sort of patient, the battered child.
The expert witness will be aware of the state of the art in that scientific
field, and the court should take advantage of that knowledge. Using the expert's testimony to establish reliability has the advantage of fairness. The
opposing party can cross-examine the expert and point out weaknesses in
the science. Either party can call additional experts to confirm or deny the
reliability of the science.
Unfortunately, this procedure may become a battle of the experts or a
trial of the science instead of the case. To avoid disrupting or delaying the
trial, an attorney might make a pre-trial motion to admit evidence on the
psychology of battered children. Without the pressures of a trial in
71. Giannelli, supra note 20, at 1215.
72. See supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., MARTIN, supra note 70.
74. See, e.g. JoNEs, supra note 59.

75. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
76. Battered child syndrome is actually a medical diagnosis referring to non-accidental
physical injury to a child. See C. Kempe, et al.,
The Battered Child, in JOURNAL OF THE
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, Vol. 181, at 17-24 (1962).
77. See, e.g., Fulcher v. State, 633 P.2d 142 (Wyo. 1981). The issue was whether a
psychiatrist could testify about automatism if the defendant had not entered a plea of not
guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency. In holding that the psychiatrist could
testify even in these circumstances, the court never questioned the reliability of the
science.
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progress, the judge can allow both sides to present their arguments
thoroughly, and the judge can make an informed and considered ruling.
At this pre-trial hearing, the attorney can demonstrate that expert
testimony on the psychology of battered children should be admissible
under Wyoming law. Qualified experts are available, the subject is beyond
common understanding so that the testimony is therefore helpful to the
trier of fact, and the scientific basis of the testimony is reliable. The Wyoming test for admissibility of expert testimony is designed to admit exactly
this kind of novel but useful scientific evidence.
CONCLUSION
78
"Every useful new development must have its first day in court." The
difficulty lies in deciding when a new scientific development is truly useful.
Evidence produced by a science so new and experimental as to be undependable will not be helpful, and may even mislead the trier of fact with its apparent precision. On the other hand, scientific evidence should not be excluded simply because it is novel or unfamiliar, for it may assist the trier of
fact in comprehending complex or technical issues beyond common
knowledge and experience.

The Wyoming Supreme Court has established a test for admissibility of
expert testimony to guide Wyoming trial courts in the difficult decisions
about scientific evidence. This test is not unduly hostile toward new scientific evidence, but it does insist that the scientific basis of the evidence be
reliable. Using this test, Wyoming trial courts should admit novel and
helpful scientific evidence like expert testimony on the psychology of battered children. The cautious but innovative spirit of the test Wyoming has
adopted should help the law keep pace with scientific advances and use
them well.
EDWARD W. HARRIS

78. United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 438 (Sth Cir. 1970).
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